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Myriad Genetics and the BRCA Patents in 
Europe: The Implications of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Decision 
Jessica C. Lai* 
Biotech patents are perhaps the most controversial form of property, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 2013 in Association for 
Medical Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, which held that simply 
isolated DNA constitutes natural products, was applauded by many, 
particularly civil society groups and medical practitioners. From a legal 
perspective, the decision itself is brief and leaves much to be desired. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to question what might be its potential impact 
on European research, the biotech industry, and patent law. Given the fact 
that the Biotech Directive was in large part passed in order to keep the 
European Union competitive with the United States, it is possible that the 
European Union has gained an advantage over the United States in terms 
of research and local industry. However, this is far from clear. At the same 
time, the Myriad decision may relight the fire surrounding the Biotech 
Directive, which was hotly debated and reluctantly implemented by the 
Netherlands, Germany, and France. This Article looks at patent law in 
Europe as it pertains to biotechnology before addressing what the possible 
implications may be of the U.S. Supreme Court Myriad decision on 
research, the biotech industry, and the policy debate in Europe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 13, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court assessed the patentability of gene-
related technologies, particularly with respect to the two genes associated with 
breast and ovarian cancer (BRCA1 and BRCA2). The Court handed down 
Association for Medical Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, declaring that simply isolated genes 
and genetic sequences (genomic DNA or gDNA) fall within the “natural product” 
doctrine and so are not capable of being “inventions” for the purposes of patent 
law—reversing part of the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.1 At the same time, the Court ruled that complementary DNA (cDNA)—
reverse transcribed mRNA—is not naturally occurring and so capable of being an 
“invention,” upholding this part of the Federal Circuit’s decision.2 
The situation in Europe (as a culmination of European Union (EU) law and 
the European Patent Convention (EPC))3 is vastly different, making a comparison 
between the approach taken in the United States and that used in Europe an 
interesting exercise. The Myriad decision highlights that attempts to define concepts 
like “natural laws” and “natural products” in the United States are rife with 
difficulties and potentially ultimately futile.4 It is difficult not to sink into a 
philosophical debate about what is “natural.” In contrast, decisions handed down 
by the European Patent Office (EPO) regarding BRCA1 and BRCA2—while 
socially controversial—were doctrinally uninteresting. Before the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Myriad decision, patents relating to BRCA1 and BRCA2 had been strongly 
opposed through the EPO for over ten years, resulting in Myriad Genetics having 
only a handful of very narrow patents in Europe.5 However, these decisions were 
 
1. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
2. Id. 
3. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 [hereinafter 
European Patent Convention]. 
4. Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 92, 97, 101 (2013). 
5. See discussion infra Part II. 
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matters of basic legal interpretation, as even before the oppositions began, Europe 
had already debated the patentability of biotechnologies and codified the results at 
the international level.6 The cases heard through the EPO, thus, had a very different 
tone. Moreover, the focus in Europe lies not in asking whether a claim is for a 
natural law or natural product but ultimately whether it is for a mere discovery and 
therefore not an “invention.” At first blush, the distinction between the two 
approaches may not be apparent. However, the different approaches can (at least 
potentially) be quite different in effect, in most part because looking at claims from 
the perspective of a mere discovery overcomes the need to define “natural laws” 
and “natural products.” 
Europe is often painted as having stricter patentability standards than the 
United States. An interesting consequence of the Myriad decision is that this is 
clearly not the case when it comes to gene-related technologies. As discussed in 
depth below, the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions 
(hereinafter the “Biotech Directive”)7 and the EPC (and its Implementing 
Regulations and Guidelines)8 allow genetic sequences as patentable subject matter, 
so long as the industrial applicability is explicitly clear from the patent application 
but not necessarily in the claims themselves. In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that simply isolated genetic sequences are not patentable subject matter, 
regardless of their potential utility.9 For patentability in the United States, one would 
have to claim isolated genetic sequences as part of a method or process that is an 
invention (and not the mere application of a natural law or abstract mental 
process).10 The lack of harmonisation between the two biotechnology powerhouses, 
Europe and the United States, may prove to have unwanted effects on invention 
and innovation. 
 
6. In Switzerland (which is not a part of the EU, but is a party to the EPC), whether gene-
related technologies should be patentable went to referendum in 1998 (Volksinitiative zum Schutz von 
Leben und Umwelt vor Genmanipulation (Gen-Schutz-Initiative) [Popular Referendum on the Protection of Life and 
the Environment against Gene Manipulation (Gene Protection Referendum)] ). Switzerland has direct democracy, 
which means that, had the referendum passed, the government would have been forced to heed it. The 
referendum sought to outlaw: (i) the generation, purchase, or distribution of transgenic animals; (ii) the 
release of genetically altered organisms into the environment; and (iii) the patenting of transgenic 
animals and plants, their components, and the relevant processes. The referendum was resoundingly 
rejected by sixty-seven percent of voters (Vote No. 440). See Gottfried Schatz, The Swiss Vote on Gene 
Technology, 281 SCIENCE 1810 (1998). Given that Switzerland was (and continues to be) a party of the 
EPC, which—as discussed further below—specifically states that gene-related inventions must be 
protected if they satisfy certain conditions, it is questionable whether Switzerland could have 
implemented the initiative into its national law without running afoul of the EPC. 
7. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) [hereinafter Biotech Directive]. 
8. European Patent Convention, supra note 3. 
9. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
10. Nevertheless, due to the biotech industry being centered in the United States and the fact 
that genetic sequences were per se patentable subject matter until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Myriad, the United States has more gene-related patents than most other countries. WILLIAM CORNISH 
ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS  
§ 21-05, at 921–22 (7th ed. 2010). 
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This Article starts by analysing the framework for biotech inventions in 
Europe. It does not rehash the Myriad decision, which has no doubt been done aptly 
by other authors in this symposium issue. The discussion on the European legal 
framework is followed by an examination of the EPO decisions made by the 
Opposition Division and Board of Appeals pertaining to Myriad Genetics’ BRCA1 
and BRCA2 patents in the chronological order in which the decisions were made. 
The Article then turns to an exploration of the potential effects of the Myriad 
decision on the European context. In particular, it looks at the uncertainty raised by 
the decision, the possible effects on invention and innovation, and whether the 
decision has possibly fuelled the policy debate in Europe. 
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS IN EUROPE 
A. The Biotech Directive and EPC 
The EU has largely dealt head on with policy issues relating to biotechnology 
at the legislative level. After over fifteen years of discussion and debate, the 
Parliament passed the Biotech Directive in 1998, which specifically addresses the 
patentability of biotech inventions.11 All EU states are also members of the 
European Patent Organisation and its organ, the EPO.12 Through the 
administration of the EPC, its Implementing Regulations,13 and its detailed 
Guidelines,14 the EPO provides for a single grant procedure for all its member 
states. According to Article 2 of the EPC the EPO does not grant a unitary 
European or EPC patent but a European patent that has the effect of national 
patents in the member states selected by the applicant. Together, the Biotech 
Directive and the EPC—and its Implementing Regulations and Guidelines—
specifically regulate whether and how gene-related inventions can be patented. 
  
 
11. In 1982, the EU Commission proposed harmonising the treatment of biotechnology by 
patent law in order to be competitive with Japan and the United States. See Vorschlag für eine Europäische 
Strategie auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft und der Technik: Rahmenprogramm 1984 bis 1987 [Proposal for a European 
Strategy in the Field of Science and Technology: Framework Program 1984 to 1987], KOM (82) 865 endg. This 
resulted in a draft Directive. Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer 
Erfindungen vom 2 Oktober 1988 [Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological 
Inventions from 2 October 1988], KOM (88), 496 endg, http://aei.pitt.edu/3814. This was rejected by the 
Parliament in 1995. After a lot of controversy, particularly pertaining to the patentability of 
biotechnology, a new draft was created by the Commission, which was accepted on July 6, 1998. Biotech 
Directive, supra note 7. Member states were to have implemented the Directive by July 20, 2000, but it 
took until 2005 for this to become a reality. 
12. The “EU” as such is not a party to the EPO or EPC. Membership to the EPO is broader 
than just EU states, including Albania, Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Serbia, 
San Marino, and Turkey. 
13. Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (last 
amended June 2012) [hereinafter EPC Implementing Regulations]. 
14. European Patent Convention Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office 
(Nov. 2014) [hereinafter EPO Guidelines]. 
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Whereas the U.S. and Canadian courts have been struggling with how to tackle 
biotechnology and its policy concerns in the realm of patent law, the EPC explicitly 
deals with certain types of biotechnology and also questions of morality. Let us take 
the oncomouse cases as an illustration. Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act provides 
that 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.15 
The Canadian provision for patentability is very similar.16 In the United States, the 
only statutory limitation to § 101 patentability is, “[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a 
human organism.”17 Though the oncomouse patent was never challenged in the 
United States,18 it was in Canada, where the Supreme Court ruled that higher life 
forms (including human beings) are not a “manufacture” or “composition of 
matter,” and therefore are not inventions.19 
In comparison, Article 53(a)–(b) of the EPC specifically states that plant and 
animal varieties are not patentable subject matter and neither are inventions the 
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality.20 The United 
States has no equivalent ordre public or morality statutory provision.21 The EPC 
Implementing Regulations clarify that the ordre public/morality clause excludes from 
patentability “processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are 
likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or 
animal and also animals resulting from such processes.”22 The approach taken by 
the EPO for the oncomouse patent was, thus, unsurprisingly quite different than in 
Canada. The EPO held that the exclusion of animal varieties was not an exclusion 
of animals, and the oncomouse was not an animal variety.23 The EPO did not have 
to try to distinguish between lower or higher life forms, or human beings and all 
other life forms, as the Biotech Directive and EPC Implementing Rules clearly draw 
the line between human beings and everything else, stating that the human body, at 
the various stages of its formation and development, and its elements are not 
 
15. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
16. Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, § 2 (Can.). 
17. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340. This 
applies for any patent application pending, filed on or after the date of enactment of the Act. It does 
not affect the validity of patents issued prior. 
18. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed April 12, 1988), which lapsed in 2005. 
19. Harvard Coll. v. Can. Comm’r of Patents, [2002] 4 R.C.S 45 (Can.). 
20. European Patent Convention, supra note 3, art. 53(a)–(b). 
21. As discussed in Jessica Downing, Analyzing the Broadening Scope of Patentability in the Advancing 
Field of Biotechnology, 18 J. COM. BIOTECHNOLOGY, Oct. 2012, at 27–31. 
22. EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 28, implementing Article 6.2(d) of the 
Biotech Directive, supra note 7. 
23. Case T 0315/03, President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. British Union for the Abolition 
of Vivisection (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2004). 
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patentable subject matter.24 Using a utilitarian balancing approach, the oncomouse 
patent was held to be valid, as the potential medical benefits to humanity in cancer 
research outweighed the suffering of the mice.25 
The EPC also excludes that which is abstract or nontechnical,26 specifically 
(but not exhaustively) delineating “discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical 
methods” as not “inventions.”27 These terms are quite different from the terms 
“natural product,” “natural law,” and “abstract idea” used in the U.S. context.28 
Something may be simply isolated from nature, but this is not to say that it is a mere 
discovery. “Mathematical method” is quite specific, whereas “abstract idea” is a 
nebulous concept.29 Perhaps most striking is the difference between “natural laws” 
and “scientific theories.”30 This is because it is highly questionable whether we can 
really define what are or are not immutable “natural laws.”31 The examples of 
“natural laws” often cited by courts are Newton’s laws of motion.32 However, it has 
been proven that Newton’s laws only work to explain what we experience in 
everyday life, or “classical physics.” Newton’s laws do not work on the quantum or 
cosmic scale. So, we can hardly say that these “laws” were just out there waiting to 
be discovered or worked out. As any scientist knows, what we have are theories, 
often supported by empirical evidence, but nevertheless open to be disproved by 
opposing empirical data. Thus, the term “scientific theories” found in the EPC is 
far more fitting and noncontradictory. 
According to the EPC, inventions must have both a concrete and technical 
character, dependant on the content of the claims, not the form or kind of claim.33 
Discoveries, scientific theories, and mathematical methods by themselves have no 
technical effect, but may be patentable subject matter if put to practical use. Finding 
a new property of a known material or article or a previously unrecognised 
substance occurring in nature is a mere discovery. However, if the new property or 
the substance found in nature has a technical effect, it may be patentable.34 Thus, 
the EPO and many European States focus on the inherent quality of the subject 
matter, requiring that it be technical in nature.35 In comparison, the U.S. approach 
 
24. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5; EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 29. 
25. Case T 0315/03, President and Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. British Union for the Abolition 
of Vivisection (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2004). It was narrowed from a claim for making oncorodents 
to oncomice, as the “substantial medical benefit” has to be demonstrated for all the animals claimed 
and the patentee did not do so. 
26. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-1. 
27. European Patent Convention, supra note 3, art. 52(2)(a). 
28. See EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-2. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. This point and the following example were made by Dan L. Burk in IP and the Two Cultures: 
Where Science Meets the Law, Lucernaiuris Laboratorium, Institute for Research in the Fundaments of Law 
Lecture Series (Oct. 7, 2014) (University of Lucerne). 
32. E.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1290 (2012). 
33. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-1. 
34. Id. at ch. II-2. 
35. For example, Germany requires that an “invention” is a “systematic teaching using 
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does not so much address whether certain subject matter constitutes an “invention,” 
but that abstract ideas, natural products, and natural laws are exceptions to 
patentability, as well as that which is not a process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter. In the United States, the focus is not upon the inherent 
nature of the subject matter at hand and whether it is technical or not, but rather 
upon whether the subject matter falls into an exception to patentability or not. 
The EPC, its Guidelines, and the Biotech Directive do not at any point rely 
on or try to define what is “natural,” such as “natural products” or “natural laws,” 
which are terms that tend to open a metaphysical debate. Instead, the focus is on 
“discovery” and its antithesis—that with a technical effect—both of which depend 
much more on human action than philosophical musing and are thus far more 
suitable for the purposes of patent law and the legal delineation between what is a 
mere discovery and what is an “invention.” It is undoubtedly different to ask 
whether something is natural or not, compared to asking whether something is a 
discovery or has a technical effect. 
The Biotech Directive has been incorporated into EPO law through the EPC 
Implementing Regulations,36 the combined effects of which are: (1) EU Members 
must protect biological materials or a process by means of which a biological 
material is produced, processed, or used;37 (2) finding a previously unrecognised 
substance (including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene) occurring in nature 
is a mere discovery;38 (3) however, “[a]n element isolated from the human body or 
otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the sequence or 
partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the 
structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element”39—what this 
means is that the mere discovery of a sequence or the location of a gene cannot be 
patentable subject matter, but a sequence or gene that is isolated or produced by a 
technical process can; (4) a substance found in nature must produce a technical 
 
controllable natural forces to achieve a result with clear cause and effect.” GERMAN PATENT AND 
TRADE MARK OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION PROCEDURE 7 (2004). Similarly for 
Switzerland, see FRANÇOIS DESSEMONTET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN SWITZERLAND, ¶¶ 
188–92 (2012). 
36. See EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 26(1), which states that the Biotech 
Directive is a supplementary means of interpretation of the EPC for biotech inventions. The EPO 
passed this through on June 16, 1999 and it came into force on September 1, 1999. Notably, much of 
the Biotech Directive reflects pre-existing EPO case law. Incorporation of such into the Biotech 
Directive forced these standards onto EU Member States at the national level. 
37. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 1(1); EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 
27. “Biological material” means any material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing 
itself or being reproduced in a biological system. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 2(a); EPC 
Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 26(3). 
38. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5.1; EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-2. 
39. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5.2; EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 
29(2). 
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effect to be patentable,40 and “[t]he industrial application of a sequence or a partial 
sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application.”41 
Of course, every invention has to have an industrial application in order to be 
patentable. However, it is not always necessary that an industrial application be 
explicitly spelt out when it is implicitly obvious.42 The Biotech Directive and EPO 
law require that this be explicit for sequences or partial sequences of a gene.43 
Although the Biotech Convention and EPO Implementing Regulations state that 
one need only disclose an industrial application in the patent application for “a 
sequence or a partial sequence of a gene,” the EPO Boards of Appeal has 
consistently held that this includes all DNA sequences, whether they form a part of 
a gene or not (so-called noncoding DNA), and RNA, whether they are genomic, 
transcribed, or regulatory. In other words, all biological nucleic acid sequences are 
included.44 Furthermore, although the title in EPO Implementing Regulations is 
“[t]he human body” and its elements, it has been interpreted by the EPO as 
extending to all biological sequences, whether from humans, other animals, plants, 
or microbes.45 
Polypeptide sequences and proteins are not nucleotide sequences. 
Nevertheless, the EPO applies the same reasoning because a polypeptide sequence 
is an expression of the gene sequence.46 Thus, if a polypeptide sequence is claimed, 
an industrial application also needs to be disclosed in the patent application.47 
 
40. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-2; see also Genentech, Inc.’s Patent, R.P.C. 147 
(1989); CORNISH ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 5–54, 21–08. 
41. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5.3; EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 
29(3). According to EPC, art. 57, “[a]n invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial 
application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry.” 
42. EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 42(1)(f). 
43. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 3.1. 
44. This is clear from the EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, chs. III-1, -2, which uses the 
terms “nucleic acid sequence” and “nucleotide sequence.” See also E-mail from Berthold Rutz, Examiner 
Directorate, European Patent Office, to author, Postdoctoral Researcher, Univ. of Lucerne, Switz. 
(Oct. 20, 2014, 2:32 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter E-mail from Berthold Rutz]. 
45. Article 5.1 and 5.2 of the Biotech Directive, requiring that natural occurring elements be 
produced through a technical process, are directed at the human body. However, Article 5.3, pertaining 
to genetic sequences, is not limited in this way. Despite the fact that Article 29 of the EPC Implementing 
Regulations places Article 5 of the EU Commission’s Biotech Directive under the heading “The human 
body and its elements,” the EPO Guidelines make it clear that Article 5.3 covers all genetic sequences, 
whether human or not; EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, chs. II-13, III-1, III-2. See also PETER 
HEINRICH, PATG/EPÜ: KOMMENTAR ZUM SCHWEIZERISCHEN PATENTGESETZ UND DEN 
ENTSPRECHENDEN BESTIMMUNGEN DES EUROPÄISCHEN PATENTÜBEREINKOMMENS 
[COMMENTARY ON THE SWISS PATENTS ACT AND THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION] 75 (2010); Rainer Moufang, Menschlicher Körper/Human Body, in 
PATENTGESETZ MIT EUROPÄISCHEM PATENTÜBEREINKOMMEN: KOMMENTAR AUF DER 
GRUNDLAGE DER DEUTSCHEN UND EUROPÄISCHEN RECHTSPRECHUNG [PATENT LAW WITH 
EUROPEAN PATENT CONVENTION: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN AND 
EUROPEAN CASE LAW] 176, 181 (Rainer Schulte ed., 2008). 
46. E-mail from Berthold Rutz, supra note 44. 
47. Case T 0870/04, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V. (EPO 
Boards of Appeal, 2005). 
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Notably, this is seldom an issue in practice because usually the function of a protein 
is known before it is sequenced, due to the difficulties in sequencing proteins.48 
This may change with advances in the field. 
B. Disclosing an Industrial Application 
It makes sense that for nucleotide sequences and polypeptide sequences that 
can simply be located, isolated, and sequenced we also demand that a specific 
industrial application be disclosed to highlight how there is or could be a technical 
effect. This is because patents are meant to reflect a technical teaching, such that to 
allow claims for such subject matter without any idea of an industrial application 
would be contrary to the purpose of the patent system. With respect to cDNA, the 
requirement is also logical. Though one might argue that cDNA is by definition 
man-made and not found and isolated, this is not the point according to Central 
European patent law. The focus is on whether the subject matter has technical effect 
and the patent discloses a technical teaching.49 Simply producing cDNA from 
mRNA does not implicitly satisfy this. 
The same can be said about nucleotide sequences and polypeptide sequences 
that are made from scratch. It may be that artificial sequences, with a different 
backbone than DNA or RNA, may be created and have a particular use, such as the 
ability to be used to create polypeptides, perhaps even artificial proteins.50 However, 
it is entirely possible that—although made from scratch in vitro—a sequence is 
identical or analogous to something that can be found in nature. Peter Heinrich has 
concluded that regardless of whether a sequence is completely technically produced 
or derived from a naturally occurring sequence, a function of the sequence must be 
disclosed, or else there would be no “invention” and no industrial application.51 
This is logical because it may be easy to simply string together an artificial nucleotide 
or polypeptide sequence (particular in the future), but such a sequence could be 
entirely useless and prone to patent trolling unless a specific function is disclosed. 
In BDP1 Phosphatase, the EPO Boards of Appeal stated that the simple 
production of a substance, the disclosure of the method thereof, and the description 
of the substance do not necessarily mean that there is industrial application, as there 
must also be a “profitable use for which the substance can be employed.”52 For 
example, the mere statement that a nucleotide sequence codes for a protein and the 
characterisation of the protein may not be sufficient. The reason for this was 
explained in Hematopoietic Receptor : 
 
48. E-mail from Berthold Rutz, supra note 44. 
49. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 3.2. 
50. The production of proteins is extremely difficult due to the complex nature in which the 
polypeptide needs to fold in on itself in order to create active sites. In nature, this usually occurs with 
the assistance of specialised “chaperone” proteins. 
51. HEINRICH, supra note 45, at 75. 
52. Case T 0870/04, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., ¶ 4,  
at 9. 
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[P]atents being an incentive to innovation and economic success, the 
criterion of “industrial applicability” requires that a patent application 
describes its subject invention in sufficiently meaningful technical terms 
that it can be expected that the exclusive rights resulting from the grant of 
a patent will lead to some financial or other commercial benefit.53 
It is not necessary that applicants show an actual or potential economic profit or a 
commercial interest.54 But the claimed use must be plausible, reasonably credible, 
or an “educated guess.”55 The disclosure of industrial application needs to provide 
a sufficiently “sound and concrete technical basis” (not vague, hypothetical, or 
speculative) for the skilled person to recognise that the claimed invention could lead 
to practical industrial exploitation, without the skilled person having to do any 
further research.56 In other words, “profitable use” should be understood as an 
“immediate concrete benefit”: 
This conveys, in the words “concrete benefit”, the need to disclose in 
definite technical terms the purpose of the invention and how it can be 
used in industrial practice to solve a given technical problem, this being the 
actual benefit or advantage of exploiting the invention. The essence of the 
requirement is that there must be at least a prospect of a real as opposed 
to a purely theoretical possibility of exploitation. Further, the use of the 
word “immediate” conveys the need for this to be derivable directly from 
the description . . . .57 
The burden cannot be placed on the reader of a patent “to guess or find a way to 
exploit it in industry by carrying out work in search for some practical application 
geared to financial gain, without any confidence that any practical application 
exists.”58 The EPO Boards of Appeal stated: 
In cases where a substance, naturally occurring in the human body, is 
identified, and possibly also structurally characterised and made available 
through some method, but either its function is not known or it is complex 
and incompletely understood, and no disease or condition has yet been 
identified as being attributable to an excess or deficiency of the substance, 
and no other practical use is suggested for the substance, then industrial 
applicability cannot be acknowledged. While the jurisprudence has tended 
to be generous to applicants, there must be a borderline between what can 
be accepted, and what can only be categorized as an interesting research 
result which per se does not yet allow a practical industrial application to 
be identified. Even though research results may be a scientific achievement 
 
53. Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 4, at 12–13 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2006). 
54. Id. ¶ 5, at 13. 
55. Id. ¶ 21, at 23, ¶ 27, at 25–26. 
56. Id. ¶ 5, at 13; Case T 0870/04, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften 
e.V., ¶ 21, at 20. 
57. Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 6, at 13–14. 
58. Case T 0870/04, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., ¶ 19, at 
19; see also Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 6, at 13–14. 
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of considerable merit, they are not necessarily an invention which can be 
applied industrially.59 
One does not satisfy the requirement of an industrial application simply by giving a 
vague and speculative indication that one may possibly attain something through 
the performance of further research with or on the disclosed substance; the 
disclosed industrial application cannot simply be to find out more about the natural 
function of the substance claimed. This is because “[t]he purpose of granting a 
patent is not to reserve an unexplored field of research for an applicant.”60 In 
Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the UK Supreme Court noted that the 
line between “plausibility” and “educated guess,” on the one hand, and 
“speculation,” on the other, is not an easy one to draw.61 However, it stated that 
EPO jurisprudence, refinement, and application of the distinction had made it 
“tolerably clear.”62 
Interestingly, the profit-orientated interpretation of “industrial applicability” 
means that claims for probes simply as research tools for the detection of the 
complementary DNA do not have industrial application, as there is no commercial 
application. However, the use of probes for diagnostic purposes does have 
industrial application.63 
The relevant substantive parts of both the Biotech Directive and the EPO 
Implementing Regulations relating to patentability only use the term “industrial 
 
59. Case T 0870/04, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V., ¶ 6, at 
10–11. 
60. Id. ¶ 21, at 20; see also Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 5, at 13. This case also clarified 
that there can be industrial applicability even in the absence of actual experimental data, on the basis of 
the description and common general knowledge. Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 20, at 22–23. In 
this case, an attributed function based on computer-assisted methods was accepted. In Case T 0604/04, 
Genentech, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham PLC, ¶ 18, at 18–19 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2006), it was held that 
the categorisation of structurally characterised polypeptide receptors under a specific category of 
receptors (in this case chemokines) was sufficient, even though the ligands of the polypeptide were not 
characterised, because chemokines were well known as being interesting for the pharmaceutical 
industry, whether their role had been clearly defined or not. Similarly, in Case T 0018/09, Human Genome 
Sciences v. Eli Lilly & Co., ¶ 22, at 38–39 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2009), the court stated that—where a 
protein family shares a specific function or specific characteristics—there may be a manifest 
“immediate concrete benefit” merely through stating that a protein belongs to this family. However, if 
members of a protein family have different functions and characteristics, then this would not suffice. 
The reasoning of the Board of Appeal was unanimously followed by the U.K. Supreme Court for the 
same patent, resulting in the same conclusion, in Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] 
UKSC 51 (appeal taken from Eng. and Wales Court of Appeal). The U.K. Supreme Court discussed 
the desirability of uniformity of principle and approach between national courts and the EPO, though 
differences in evidence and arguments may result in different results. Id. ¶¶ 83–87, at 27–28. The U.K. 
Supreme Court summarises EPO jurisprudence on “industrial application” at paragraphs 43–68, at 12–
21, and paragraph 107, at 32–34. 
61. Human Genome Sciences, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., [2011] UKSC 51, ¶ 123, at 38. 
62. Id. 
63. Case T 1213/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz, 
¶ 62, at 57 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2007); Case T 0666/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Institut 
Curie, ¶ 84, at 47 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2008). 
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application.”64 However, the preambular text of the Biotech Directive states that a 
mere sequence without indication of a “function” is not considered to contain any 
technical information, but it is a mere substance found in nature and so not 
patentable subject matter.65 It further notes that, where a sequence is used to 
produce a protein or part of a protein, it must be specified which protein is 
produced (or part thereof) and what function it performs.66 The introduction of the 
term “function” in the preambular text of the Biotech Directive is interesting 
because it is not a typical patent law term. The EPO Guidelines also refer to the 
term “function;”67 however, it is notable that they only do so when referencing the 
preambular paragraphs of the Biotech Directive that also use the term.68 Otherwise, 
the EPO Guidelines refer to “industrial application.”69 
C. Absolute- or Purpose-Bound Claims 
The requirement that a concrete industrial application or function be explicitly 
disclosed seeks to ensure that there is a technical effect and, therefore, an 
“invention.”70 According to the Biotech Directive and EPO Guidelines, the 
industrial application need only be disclosed in the patent application description 
and not necessarily specifically in the claims.71 EPO-granted product claims for 
nucleotide sequences and polypeptide sequences are, therefore, not per se limited 
to the disclosed industrial application (“purpose bound”). Claims are drafted as 
traditional “absolute” claims, whereby the patentee has protection over all potential 
future uses of the sequences.72 
The EPO only deals with substantive questions of patentability.73 Jurisdiction 
over certain postgrant issues such as patentee rights and patent effects remain with 
 
64. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5.3. 
65. Id. pmbl. ¶ 23, at L 213/15. 
66. Id. pmbl. ¶ 24, at L 213/15. The English version of the text actually uses the word “or” 
instead of “and,” and the French version uses “ou.” The author here has decided to adopt the German 
version—which uses “und”—because this is the most consistent with EPO case law, which, as 
discussed above, has always required that one do more than simply disclose how to produce a substance 
and describe what that substance is. 
67. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. III-2. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. On the possible consequences of the different terminology existent in Europe, see Jessica 
C. Lai, Gene-Related Inventions in Europe: Purpose- vs Function-Bound Protection, 5 Queen Mary J. Intell. Prop. 
449 (2015). 
70. It also touches upon the standard of the inventive step and ensuring that there is sufficient 
disclosure of the invention. See Case T 0898/05, ZymoGenetics, Inc., ¶ 6, at 13–14 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 
2006); HEINRICH, supra note 45, at 58, 74; Johanna Gibson, The Discovery of Invention: Gene Patents and the 
Question of Patentability, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 38, 39 (2007); Moufang, supra note 45, at 176, 178. 
71. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 5.3; EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. III-1. This 
is also the case in Switzerland. See Code Civil [CC] [Civil Code] June 25, 1954, CC 232.14, art. 49.2.b, as 
amended by No. I of the Federal Act, June 22, 2007, AS 2008 2551, BB1 2006 1 (“The patent application 
must contain . . . a description of the invention and, where a claim is made for a sequence derived from 
a sequence or partial sequence of a gene, a specific description of the function it performs.”). 
72. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. III-1. 
73. See European Patent Convention, supra note 3. 
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Member States.74 Postgrant patent effects are to some degree regulated by the 
Biotech Directive.75 However, the effect of claims for nucleotide sequences is by 
no means clear-cut. Due to the open wording of the Biotech Directive, there is 
uncertainty surrounding whether it was the intention that the disclosure of an 
industrial application or function consequent that product claims for nucleotide 
sequences be purpose bound rather than absolute.76 One could argue that the 
requirement to disclose an industrial application must limit the patent scope of the 
claims, otherwise the requirement does nothing more than repeat the industrial 
application standard. Why not simply utilise the standard of “industrial application” 
to ensure there is industrial applicability? On the other hand, one could also reason 
that the requirement ensures that there is an “invention” and industrial applicability 
at grant, decreasing the need to initiate patent revocation proceedings later on. But, 
once granted, the requirement to disclose an industrial application does not limit 
the effect of the patent. After all, the naming of an industrial application in the 
patent description, such as for a classic chemical invention, never limits the scope 
of patent claims. 
Moreover, had the intention been to create purpose-bound claims, the Biotech 
Directive and EPO law could simply have stopped at stating that a sequence or 
partial sequence of a gene is a mere discovery, thus restricting patentability to use 
or application claims, rather than allowing product claims. Instead, the combined 
effect of the Biotech Directive and EPO law is to allow for product claims covering 
sequences or partial sequences of a gene if produced by a technical process and so 
long as an industrial application is provided. The intention was clearly not to have 
only use or application claims. Indeed, the purpose of the Biotech Directive was to 
ensure that all EU Member States do protect gene-related technologies.77 The 
Biotech Directive was intended to be propatent, such that it does not make sense 
to interpret it as limiting protection as purpose bound. 
The postgrant effects of patents are, to some extent, regulated by Article 9 of 
the Biotech Directive, which stipulates that: 
The protection conferred by a patent on a product containing or consisting 
of genetic information shall extend to all material, save as provided in Article 
 
74. Id. art. 64.3. 
75. See Biotech Directive, supra note 7, arts. 8–12. 
76. Geertrui Van Overwalle, The CJEU’s Monsanto Soybean Decision and Patent Scope–as Clear as 
Mud, 42 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 2–3 (2011). Some commentators do not see 
the confusion and deem that an EPO-granted patent clearly grants absolute product claims. E.g., 
Christoph Ann, Patents on Human Gene Sequences in Germany: On Bad Lawmaking and Ways to Deal with It, 
7 GERMAN. L.J. 279, 286 (2006). 
77. Vorschlag für eine Europäische Strategie auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft und Technik: Rahmenprogramm 
1984 bis 1987 [Proposal for a European Strategy in the Field of Science and Technology: Framework Program 1984 
to 1987], supra note 11, at 7, 22–24; see also Michael A. Kock, Purpose-Bound Protection for DNA Sequences: 
In Through the Back Door?, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 495, 499–503 (2010) (outlining in-depth how 
the legislative intent was clearly not for purpose-bound protection). 
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5(1), in which the product in [sic] incorporated and in which the genetic 
information is contained and performs its function.78 
The use of the term “genetic information” here is somewhat strange. Article 9 is the 
only article within the substantive part of the Biotech Directive that uses the term 
“genetic information.”79 In contrast, Article 5 on patentability refers to “the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene.”80 Similarly, Article 9 contains the only 
reference to the term “function” in the operative text of the Biotech Directive.81 It 
is confusing because the part of the Biotech Directive on patentability and the 
requirement of disclosure refers to “industrial application.”82 It is unclear if the 
drafters intended the terms to have distinct meanings and what the consequences 
of this might be. However, it is interesting to note that for patentable subject matter 
we have the terms “the sequence or partial sequence of a gene” and “industrial 
application,” which sound very product orientated. Whereas for postgrant effects, 
we suddenly have the very information- or use-orientated terms of “genetic 
information” and “function.” 
It has also been argued that Article 9 should mean that claims for genetic 
sequences be limited to the disclosed industrial application, that is, purpose bound. 
In 2010, the Court of Justice of the EU interpreted Article 9. From this judgement, 
we know that—with respect to third-party use of a patented genetic sequence—the 
sequence has to at least be able to perform the function indicated in order to be 
infringing.83 The Court of Justice of the EU did not specify if the third-party use 
has to exploit this function in order to be infringing. It is not difficult to imagine 
situations where a patented sequence is placed into a cell and capable of performing 
the function indicated but is nevertheless being used for another purpose, or is 
simply in a cell and not being used at all. It is also unclear what the law is when the 
sequence is technically viable to undertake the disclosed function but not in an 
environment where it is able to do so. The Court of Justice of the EU, thus, did not 
take the opportunity to indicate whether the Biotech Directive requires that the 
effects of claims for genetic sequences be purpose bound or not. 
It is highly doubtful that Article 9 can be used to find that gene-related 
 
78. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 9 (emphasis added). 
79. It appears nonsubstantively in preambular paragraph 41 regarding the cloning of human 
beings with the “same nuclear genetic information,” id. pmbl. ¶ 41, at L 213/16, and also in Article 2 
under the definition of “biological material,” id. art II, at L213/18. 
80. Id. art 5, at L213/18. 
81. Id. art. 9, at L 213/19. 
82. Id. art. 5, at L213/18; pmbl. ¶ 22, at L 213/15. 
83. Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 CR I-6765 (interpreting Biotech 
Directive, supra note 7, art. 9). The opinion of the Advocate General of this case was far clearer in 
finding that the protection conferred on DNA sequences in the EU is “purpose bound.” Opinion of 
Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, ¶¶ 29–33, at 7/16–8/16 
(2010). This decision has also been interpreted as saying that protection is purpose bound. Caroline 
Pallard & Bart Swinkels, The Role of the Function of DNA Sequence Before and After Grant, LIFE SCI. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 56, 58 (2011). This author agrees with Geertrui Van Overwalle that this is not remotely 
clear. Overwalle, supra note 76, at 2. 
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technologies can only have purpose-bound protection. This is because the intention 
behind Article 9 was to extend patent protection and ensure that patentees did not 
lose control of their invention as a result of the first-sale doctrine (exhaustion of 
patent rights) and the ability of many gene-related inventions to propagate (thereby 
infringing on the patentee’s right to make the invention).84 The limitation within 
Article 9 that the genetic information must perform its function was implemented 
in recognition of the fact that genetic information can be bred out or may be 
nonviable in harvested or produced materials.85 Article 9 is only relevant for gene-
related inventions that are used in vivo; it is not relevant for those used ex vivo or in 
vitro and which are not propagated.86 It therefore cannot be interpreted as restricting 
claims for gene-related technologies to being purpose bound. Thus, the Court of 
Justice of the EU decision that a patentee’s rights extend to materials where the 
genetic information is capable of performing the indicated function is logical.87 
However, it only applies to situations where there is or was propagation or 
multiplication. 
Not limiting the patent rights to the disclosed industrial application has been 
argued to offer patentees rights disproportionately large compared to their 
contribution to the field.88 In mid-2005, the EU Commission discussed the question 
but refused to take a particular position.89 A few months later, the EU Parliament 
passed a Resolution, calling for the EPO and Member States to only grant patent 
claims covering human DNA if limited to a concrete application, so that others may 
use the same DNA sequences for other applications (i.e., purpose-bound 
protection).90 Despite this, the issue remains unresolved.91 In any case, the limited 
nature of the Parliament’s Resolution restricted only to human DNA is highly 
questionable, as there is no logical distinction between human DNA and other 
DNA. Nor is there any sensible reason why one should differentiate between DNA, 
RNAs, and polypeptide sequences. 
D. Policy Concerns 
With the Biotech Directive and the EPC, the policy discussion within the EU 
has taken place at the legislative level. The preambular text of the Biotech Directive 
makes this very clear. On the one hand, it mentions the increasing importance of 
 
84. Kock, supra note 77, at 500. 
85. Id. at 500, 505. 
86. This is clear from reading the rest of Chapter II of the Biotech Directive on “Scope of 
Protection,” namely Arts. 8, 10, and 11. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, at arts. 8, 10, 11. 
87. Kock draws the same conclusion. Kock, supra note 77, at 512. 
88. Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC, ¶ 32, at  
8/16. 
89. Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Development and Implications 
of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, at 3–5, COM (2005) final ( July 14, 2005). 
90. European Parliament Resolution on Patents on Biotechnological Inventions, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. P6 TA-PROV (2005) 0407, point 5. 
91. Because the Court of Justice failed to clarify the situation in Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. 
LLC. 
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the biotech industry for development, the environment, healthcare, and agriculture 
in developing countries as well as the high-risk investment involved.92 This reflects 
the concerns raised by the EU Commission in 1982 that differences in patent law 
and the way it treated biotechnology in EU Member States were hindering the EU’s 
ability to compete with the United States and Japan with respect to biotechnology.93 
On the other hand, the preambular text addresses the fact that there are competing 
interests, such as the dignity and integrity of human beings and animal suffering,94 
and that the exceptions to patentability under the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)95 for ordre public or morality are 
relevant and a matter for Member States to assess (though some inventions are 
explicitly—but not exclusively—listed in the Directive as being contrary to ordre 
public or morality, such as processes that offend human dignity, including processes 
to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of human and animals, 
otherwise modifying the human germ line or cloning human beings, and using 
human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes).96 The Biotech Directive 
further explicitly discusses why isolated genetic sequences are patentable subject 
matter, stating that: 
[S]uch an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced is 
not excluded from patentability since it is, for example, the result of 
technical processes used to identify, purify and classify it and to reproduce 
it outside the human body, techniques which human beings alone are 
capable of putting into practice and which nature is incapable of 
accomplishing by itself.97 
There is patentable subject matter in isolated DNA, RNA, and cDNA sequences 
 
92. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶¶ 1–3, at L 213/13, ¶¶ 10–11, 17, at L 213/14. 
93. Vorschlag für eine Europäische Strategie auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft und Technik: Rahmenprogramm 
1984 bis 1987 [Proposal for a European Strategy in the Field of Science and Technology: Framework Program 1984 
to 1987], supra note 11. 
94. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 16, at L 213/14, ¶ 45, at L 213/16. 
95. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
299. 
96. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶¶ 36–42, at L 213/16 & art. 6.2; see also EPC 
Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 28 (outlining certain biotechnological inventions that are 
not patentable subject matter because their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or 
morality under Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention). Regarding the definition of “human 
embryos” and “use for industrial or commercial purposes” as per the directive, see Case C-34/10, Brüstle 
v. Greenpeace e.V., 2011 E.C.R. I-9821, ¶ 23, at I - 9867–68. This decision held that “human embryos” is 
to be understood in a wide sense and courts are to ask whether the cells are capable of commencing 
the process of development of a human being. Id. ¶¶ 34–37, I – 9871–72. It further held that the grant 
of a patent implies “use for industrial or commercial purposes,” id. ¶ 41, I – 9873, and that use for the 
purposes of scientific research is included under “use for industrial or commercial purposes.” Id. ¶¶ 
43–46, I – 9873–74. The Court of Justice further held that skillful drafting—leaving out of the claims 
the nonpatentable use of human embryos, such as the destruction of the embryos or use as a base 
material—cannot be used to patent something that must use human embryos in a nonpatentable way 
in order to be implemented, regardless of the stage at which the use takes place. Id. ¶¶ 49–52, I – 9875–
76. 
97. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 21, at L 213/15. 
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because a laboratory process is involved in either the translation and/or isolation of 
the sequences.98 The Biotech Directive (and the EPC) does not require that the 
claimed sequences be chemically different than their in-cell counterparts.99 
Unlike in U.S. courts, which are left with quite a lot of room for policy-
informed decision-making, it is not the role of the EPO to make policy decisions. 
Indeed, the EPO Guidelines specifically state that the EPO has not been vested 
with the task of assessing the economic effects of the grant of certain types of 
technology and deciding patentable subject matter accordingly.100 There are 
undoubtedly advantages of the approach in the EU, specifically that there is more 
certainty, as illustrated by the EPO BRCA decisions discussed in Part II. 
Governments often push the decision-making onto the courts, which are in turn 
often reluctant to make policy decisions. In the EU, at least someone is making 
policy decisions. At the same time, the Biotech Directive and EPC remove a lot of 
flexibility, which is dangerous in an area of law that deals specifically with new 
technologies. For example, perhaps the Biotech Directive and EPC work now with 
the biotechnology of today, but how will these instruments deal with the 
biotechnology of tomorrow? 
II. BRCA PATENTS IN EUROPE 
As a consequence of the Biotech Directive and EPC, the oppositions heard 
against Myriad Genetics’ BRCA patents in Europe were of little legal interest. Like 
in the Myriad case, the strong contestation reflected the social unease with regard to 
gene-related patents. However, unlike the Myriad case, the EPO’s role was one of 
strict legislative application due to the very clear nature of the pertinent parts of 
EPO law. The following Sections briefly outline the decisions made by the EPO. 
A. EP0705902 “17q-Linked Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene”  
(Case T 1213/05) 
This case predominantly dealt with priority and whether priority could be 
claimed from a U.S. Patent Application (filed September 2, 1994, designated the P2 
priority application) that disclosed the BRCA1 sequence with errors.101 Namely, 
fifteen nucleotides of the cDNA sequence disclosed were incorrect, nine of which 
led to amino acid changes and six of which were “silent deviations” not impacting 
on amino acid expression.102 None of the deviations were an insertion or deletion 
or resulted in a stop codon. The correct “open reading frame”103 for BRCA1 was 
 
98. CORNISH ET AL., supra note 10, at ¶ 21-08. 
99. Id. 
100. EPO Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. II-7. 
101. Case T 1213/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. V. Sozialdemokratische Partei der 
Schweiz, ¶ I (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2007). 
102. Id. ¶ 20, at 27. 
103. A “reading frame” is the identification of the sets of three nucleotides that make up codons 
in a nucleotide sequence. An “open reading frame” contains a start and stop codon in the same frame, 
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disclosed in P2, which was important for the BRCA1 method patent at issue in Case 
T 0080/05, which is discussed below.104 The Opposition Division and the Board of 
Appeal took a strict and structural understanding of the “the same invention” to 
conclude that the errors meant that there was no priority as the prior art document 
did not disclose “the same invention.”105 As a result, Myriad Genetics only had 
priority from a later U.S. Patent Application (filed March 24, 1995), could not claim 
the BRCA1 sequence as a whole, and the patent claims were limited to probes (short 
strands of the BRCA1 sequence) to isolate the gene, cloning vectors, and host 
cells.106 
The Board of Appeal also addressed whether the probes were discoveries, as 
per Article 52(2) of the EPC. It very succinctly held that there was patentable subject 
matter in light of Rule 29(2) of the EPC Implementing Regulations,107 which states 
that elements of the human body that are isolated or technically produced, including 
a sequence or partial sequence of a gene, can constitute inventions.108 The nucleic 
acid probes comprising partial DNA sequences of the human BRCA1 gene were 
obtained by technical processes and were thereby isolated elements of the human 
body and thus patentable subject matter.109 
The opponents also argued that the claims violated ordre public or morality 
because the Applicants did not prove that they had consent to use the cells from 
which they identified the BRCA1 gene, or consent for the commercial exploitation 
of research results, as well as access and benefit sharing.110 The Board of Appeal 
stated that EPC law does not require that applicants submit evidence of prior 
informed consent or access and benefit sharing.111 The Board of Appeal also 
rejected arguments that the socioeconomic consequences of the claims were 
contrary to ordre public or morality. It held that it is the “exploitation of the 
invention” that is relevant, not the “exploitation of the patent” and issues relating 
to increased costs for patients and the impact on diagnosis and research have to do 
with the latter.112 Moreover, focussing on the exploitation of the patent is illogical, 
as “such an objection applies to the exploitation of any patent, as the nature of the 
consequences of the exploitation of a patent (which derive from the exclusionary 
nature of private property rights), are the same for all patents.”113 The Board further 
affirmed that the EPO does not have the competence to take into account the 
economic effects of granting patents and to restrict certain fields of patentable 
 
the totality of which should translate into a protein. http://bioweb.uwlax.edu/genweb/molecular/
seq_anal/translation/translation.html [http://perma.cc/7U35-7U72]. 
104. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
105. Case T 1213/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found., at ¶¶ 22–34, at 29–41. 
106. Id. ¶ 34, at 41. 
107. Rule 23e(2) at the time the Decision was handed down. See id. ¶ 56, at 54. 
108. EPC Implementing Regulations, supra note 13, r. 29(2). 
109. Case T 1213/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found., at ¶¶ 43–45, at 46. 
110. Id. ¶ 53, at 50–51. 
111. Id. ¶¶ 46–50, at 47–49. 
112. Id. ¶ 53, at 50–51. 
113. Id. 
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subject matter accordingly.114 This lack of competence is very different from the 
potential flexibility that courts in the United States have to take policy issues into 
account. Finally, as a distinct legal order, the EPC does not need to be interpreted 
in light of national legislation of its member states—namely the ethical concerns 
reflected in the French and German legislation115—or a Resolution from the EU 
Parliament calling for purpose-bound protection.116 
It was further argued that the probes had no industrial application because: 
The capacity of a single stranded DNA sequence to hybridize with a 
complementary single-stranded sequence was a consequence of the 
physico-chemical properties of each single-stranded DNA molecule and 
was thus a universal characteristic thereof. It could not have been the 
intention of the legislator to accept such universal characteristic as basis 
for an industrial application . . . , as this would have the consequence that 
each and every single-stranded DNA was industrially applicable . . . .117 
The Board of Appeal dismissed this, stating that there was industrial applicability as 
the probes were useful for diagnostic purposes and were thus able to be used 
commercially to detect the presence of BRCA1 alleles predisposing individuals to 
breast cancer.118 
B. EP0705903 “Mutations in the 17q-Linked Breast and Ovarian Cancer  
Susceptibility Gene” (Case T 0666/05) 
One of Myriad Genetics’ European patents for BRCA1 (for mutations 
indicating a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer) was also narrowed, in 
2008, from a method covering thirty-four mutations to only one “frame-shift” 
mutation (the deletion or insertion of one or two nucleotides).119 This was a result 
of the filing of the incorrect sequence (as noted above), making them lose priority. 
Specifically, Myriad Genetics narrowed the patent to the “185delAG → ter39” 
mutation, which means deletion of the nucleotides “AG” at position 185, which 
would result in a stop codon in codon number 39.120 The claims relating to the one 
frame-shift mutation covered a method for diagnosing a predisposition for breast 
and ovarian cancer with respect to this mutation and a related probe.121 Myriad 
Genetics did not lose priority for this particular mutation and related probe, as the 
errors made in the priority document did not affect the detection of this particular 
mutation or the nucleotides of the related probe.122 The method simply called for 
 
114. Id. 
115. See discussion infra Part III. 
116. See discussion supra Section I.D. 
117. Case T 1213/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found., ¶ 60, at 56. 
118. Id. ¶ 62, at 57. 
119. Case T 0666/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Institut Curie, ¶ I, at 1 (EPO Boards 
of Appeal, 2008). 
120. Id. ¶ VI, at 3. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. ¶ 40, at 27–28. 
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the detection of the deletion of AG at position 185 (which was nowhere near any 
of the errors) and not a comparison between the patient’s nucleotide or amino acid 
sequence and a reference sequence.123 
Similar to the decision T 1213/05, the Board of Appeal held that the probe 
had been obtained by a technical process and was therefore an isolated element of 
the human body and patentable.124 The Board also followed the T 1213/05 decision 
regarding the irrelevance of economic and ethical considerations of the patenting 
of diagnostic methods involving the use of human genetic materials125 and held that 
nucleic acid probes have industrial applicability.126 
C. EP0699754 “Method for Diagnosing a Predisposition for Breast and Ovarian Cancer” 
(Case T 0080/05) 
In 2008, Myriad Genetics’ patent covering methods for diagnosing a 
predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer regarding BRCA1 was also 
narrowed.127 The patent had been fully revoked in 2004 as a result of Myriad 
Genetics registering the incorrect genetic sequence, meaning that full diagnosis was 
not possible from their application, making it lose priority.128 The Board of Appeal 
reversed this decision when Myriad Genetics reduced the scope of the claims to 
methods for diagnosing a predisposition for breast and ovarian cancer with respect 
to frame-shift mutations because the exact correct sequence is not required to detect 
frame-shift mutations.129 Myriad Genetics rephrased their methods to reference the 
open reading frame (which, as noted above, was correctly disclosed in the P2 
priority application) rather than the sequence disclosed in P2.130 The Board 
distinguished the case from Case T 1213/05, stating that the earlier case pertained 
to product claims, where the errors affected a technical feature of the invention, 
whereas the errors did not affect the technical feature of the diagnostic method for 
frame-shift mutations.131 
The opponent argued that the methods at suit were “based on the discovery 
of a mutation in the genome of a human, on the further discovery of a relationship 
that exists in nature between this mutation and a disease and on the purely mental 
act that a human having this mutation has a predisposition for the disease,” and 
thereby not inventions as per EPC, Article 52(2)(a) and (c).132 The Board of Appeal 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. ¶ 76, at 43. 
125. Id. ¶ 82, at 45–46. 
126. Id. ¶ 84, at 47. 
127. Case T 0080/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found. v. Institut Curie (EPO Boards of Appeal, 
2008). 
128. Institut Curie v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., European Patent Office Opposition Division, 
Division Revoking the European Patent EP0699754 (3 November 2004); https://register
.epo.org/application?number=EP95305602  [https://perma.cc/N5L8-QVLV]. 
129. Case T 0080/05, Univ. of Utah Research Found., ¶ VI, at 3–4. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. ¶ 39, at 28. 
132. Id. ¶ 57, at 36. 
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held that the EPC Implementing Regulation Rule stating that an element isolated 
from the human body or otherwise produced by technical means may constitute a 
patentable invention applies a fortiori to method claims.133 The claims at issue were 
therefore not discoveries as per Article 52(2)(a). Regarding whether the claims were 
purely mental acts as per Article 52(2)(c), the Board ruled that the diagnostic method 
of determining the presence of frame-shift mutations requires “working steps of [a] 
technical nature which belong to the preceding steps which are constitutive for 
making a diagnosis as an intellectual exercise.”134 The method claims to detect 
frame-shift mutations were also held to have industrial applicability due to the 
decisive connection between the BRCA1 polypeptide and breast and ovarian 
cancer.135 
The Board of Appeal, furthermore, upheld the long-settled understanding that 
only diagnostic methods performed on a living human or animal body are excluded 
from patentability under EPC Article 53(c), and not those performed on tissue 
samples.136 Finally, as in Case T 0666/05, the Board followed the T 1213/05 
decision to dismiss the relevance of economic and ethical consequences of patenting 
diagnostic methods involving the use of human genetic material.137 
D. EP0785216 “Chromosome 13–Linked Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA2”138 
Myriad Genetics had one EPO-granted patent for BRCA2, which was initially 
granted for the gene, disease-associated mutations and breast cancer-predisposing 
mutations.139 In 2005, the patent was narrowed to a single claim over a nucleic-acid 
sequence that carries the BRCA2 mutation that is associated with a predisposition 
to breast cancer in Ashkenazi Jewish women.140 The claim specifically refers to 
“6174delT” or the deletion of a T at position 6174 “for diagnosing a predisposition 
to breast cancer in Ashkenazi-Jewish women in vitro.”141 
The mutation claimed had been described before the priority date of the 
application, such that a distinguishing technical feature was required to overcome 
 
133. Id. ¶ 59, at 37. 
134. Id. ¶ 60, at 37. 
135. Id. ¶ 67, at 40. 
136. Id. ¶¶ 62–63, at 38. 
137. Id. ¶ 65, at 39. 
138. European Patent No. 0 785 216 (B2) (filed Dec. 17, 1996). In an earlier decision, the Board 
of Appeal revoked a patent belonging to Cancer Research UK (often called the “Stratton patent” after 
the lead inventor Michael Stratton), which had claimed BRCA2 as a product-by-process claim and also 
a method of diagnosis. Myriad Genetics successfully opposed the patent on the basis of priority and 
novelty. See Case T 0902/07, Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., (EPO Boards of Appeal, 
2010). 
139. European Patent No. 0 785 216 (B2), supra note 138. 
140. In June 2005, the EPO Opposition Division determined the patent be maintained in 
amended form. This decision was not appealed to the Technical Board of Appeal. There was a Board 
of Appeal decision, however this only related to priority. See Case T 0156/08, Univ. of Utah Research 
Found., ¶ 4, at 8 (EPO Boards of Appeal, 2011). 
141. European Patent No. 0 785 216 (B2), supra note 138 (emphasis added). 
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the standards of novelty and obviousness.142 The reference to Ashkenazi-Jewish 
women was thus included to be the distinguishing technical feature, as the mutation 
had not previously been linked to this subgroup.143 The Opposition Division sided 
with the applicant, deciding that the claim was not immoral in relation to Article 
53(a).144 
E. Overall? 
Overall, neither BRCA1 nor BRCA2 were strongly patented in Europe. 
Neither gene, nor a related nucleic acid or polypeptide sequence, was patented as a 
whole. Regarding BRCA1, Myriad Genetics only had product claims over probes to 
isolate the gene, cloning vectors, and host cells; the “185delAG → ter39” mutation 
and a related probe; and method claims over frame-shift mutations.145 The claims 
covering the probe to isolate the gene would not have prevented one from 
sequencing in order to locate BRCA1.146 One could have gotten around the 
“185delAG → ter39” mutation patent by simply sequencing down the gene to 
observe the effect of the deletion. The method patent covering frame-shift mutation 
was arguably the most restrictive, as most (and the most severe) cancer-causing 
mutations recognised in BRCA1 are caused by frame-shift mutations.147 However, 
the narrowing of the two mutation patents has created some confusion regarding at 
what point in a diagnosis the patents would be infringed.148 This is because they 
simply claim “a method” (i.e., any method), rather than a specific method for 
determining the presence of the mutations. Is it simply the process of sequencing? 
Or only if the “185delAG → ter39” mutation on BRCA1 or a frame-shift mutation 
on BRCA2 is found? Is then the outcome of the diagnosis determinative of whether 
there is infringement?149 
As to BRCA2, Myriad Genetics has only one claim covering mutation 
“6174delT” for diagnosing a predisposition to breast cancer in Ashkenazi-Jewish 
women in vitro. This is exceedingly narrow. At the same time, this claim has been 
stated to be discriminatory and also impractical, given that many people of 
Ashkenazi Jewish descent are not aware of their ancestry. Gert Matthijs noted that 
“there is something fundamentally wrong if one ethnic group can be singled out by 
patenting” and that “women coming to be tested for breast cancer will have to be 
 
142. Gert Matthijs et al., The European BRCA Patent Oppositions and Appeals: Coloring Inside the 




146. Id. at 707. 
147. Id. at 708. 
148. See Alison Abbott, Europe to Pay Royalties for Cancer Gene, NATURE (Dec. 2, 2008), http://
www.nature.com/news/2008/081202/full/456556a.html. 
149. See Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27 NAT. 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 908 (2009). 
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asked whether they are Ashkenazi Jewish or not.”150 It is additionally unclear at what 
point the claim would be infringed, as it merely refers to the “use” of the mutation 
for diagnosing a predisposition for breast cancer. Does the mutation have to be 
found for there to be infringement? Would the claim be infringed if a diagnosis for 
the “6174delT” mutation were performed on a woman who did not know that she 
was Ashkenazi-Jewish, but found out later that she was? What if an Ashkenazi-
Jewish woman had her entire BRCA2 sequenced and she happened to have the 
“6174delT” mutation? 
III. WHAT DOES THE MYRIAD DECISION MEAN FOR EUROPE? 
Though Myriad Genetics’ patents were controversial in Europe, and 
arguments were made to revoke or narrow them on the ground of “non-invention,” 
ultimately the EPO restricted patent claims relating to BRCA1 and BRCA2 mostly 
on the basis of lost priority.151 The Boards of Appeal showed unwillingness to 
entertain the idea that isolated genetic materials are not capable of being 
“inventions.” Quite rightly so, given the restricted nature of the EPO’s mandate and 
competence.152 At the time that the Biotech Directive was adopted and the BRCA 
cases were heard in Europe, simply isolated genetic materials were considered to be 
“inventions” in the United States.153 The Biotech Directive was in most part 
adopted in order to harmonise the patent protection of biotechnology in Europe, 
as this was seen as necessary to ensure that the European biotech industry could 
compete with that in the United States and Japan.154 In other words, it was seen as 
necessary to encourage research, innovation, and investment in biotechnology in 
Europe. After the Myriad decision, the landscape in Europe is arguably different. If 
the U.S. trend is to hold simply isolated biological materials as mere natural 
products, this could have a significant impact on the invention and innovation and 
policy debate in Europe. 
A. The Meaning of Myriad 
Before one can analyse the potential impact of the Myriad decision on the 
European context, it is important to note the uncertainty surrounding the exact 
scope of the decision. The Myriad judgement tells us that simply isolated genes and 
 
150. Slimmed Down Breast Cancer Gene Patent Upheld, BIONEWS ( June 30, 2005), http://
www.bionews.org.uk/page_12415.asp [http://perma.cc/6JVD-F66D]. 
151. Katerina Sideri, Practical Reasoning, Impartiality and the European Patent Office: The Legal 
Regulation of Biotechnology, 18 EUR. L.J. 821, 838 (2012). 
152. See id. at 838–42, for an argument against the merely interpretative nature of the EPO. 
153. As noted in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO. 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2107 (2013). 
154. Vorschlag für eine Europäische Strategie auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft und Technik: 
Rahmenprogramm 1984 bis 1987 [Proposal for a European Strategy in the Field of Science and Technology: Framework 
Program 1984 to 1987], supra note 11, the entirety of which discusses the European patent situation 
compared to that of Japan and the United States. 
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genetic sequences are natural products, but this does not explicitly tell us what a 
natural product is.155 We know from the decision that cDNA is not a natural 
product because it is man-made.156 This is despite the evidence that cDNA in fact 
does exist naturally, even in humans, as a consequence of retroviruses which 
transcribe mRNA into cDNA.157 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that “[t]he 
possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule 
similar to one created synthetically through human ingenuity does not render a 
composition of matter nonpatentable.”158 But what does this tell us about what a 
natural product is? 
The Supreme Court essentially held that what is “natural” is what exists with 
certainty without human intervention. Even if this could be taken as the ratio 
decidendi of the decision, it was arguably incorrectly applied to isolated DNA, as 
isolated genetic sequences and genes do not exist in isolated form in cells. Even if 
one were to presume that isolated genetic sequences are in all ways identical to their 
in-cell counterparts, the approach of the Supreme Court also does not take into 
account that there may be situations where there is absolute certainty that something 
exists in nature without the influence of man, but this is not the same as having that 
thing accessible for use.159 In other words, that a genetic sequence exists in nature 
is not the same as knowing its exact location and wild-type sequence (the sequence 
most frequently found in nature). If patent law exists to incentivise the introduction 
of something of value to society, both with respect to the physical invention itself 
and the information behind it, patent law should award those who make something 
available to the public that previously was not.160 
The Supreme Court’s decision is further unhelpful because of its use of an 
informational or functional rationale for gDNA161 but a structural rationale for 
cDNA.162 It has been suggested that judging whether something is structurally and 
functionally distinct enough from that in nature should be done on a sliding scale, 
as sometimes small structural differences can result in large changes in functionality 
 
155. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013). 
156. Id. 
157. See David Baltimore, Viral RNA-dependent DNA Polymerase: RNA-dependent DNA Polymerase 
in Virions of RNA Tumour Viruses, 226 NATURE 1209 (1970); Howard M. Temin & Satoshi Mizutani, 
Viral RNA-dependent DNA Polymerase: RNA-dependent DNA Polymerase in Virions of Rous Sarcoma Virus, 
226 NATURE 1211 (1970). 
158. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 n.8 (emphasis in original). 
159. Dan L. Burk, Anticipating Patentable Subject Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 112 
(2013). 
160. Historically, most states had local novelty standards, meaning that one could “invent” 
through being the first to import something. It did not matter that the invention already existed 
elsewhere because travelling from land to land used to be long and dangerous. Today, most states have 
universal novelty standards, as travel is no longer perilous and modern technology means that 
information travels differently. 
161. The U.S. Supreme Court stated that “genes and the information they encode” are not patentable. 
Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (emphasis added). 
162. Id. at 2119 n.7. 
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and vice versa.163 This is not particularly helpful with DNA, as any isolated genetic 
sequence or whole gene will be structurally different because it will not fold on itself 
as it would in-cell.164 Furthermore, given that it is the informational component of 
nucleic acids that makes them of interest to man, their functionality (not to be 
confused with their utility) will often be the same as in-cell. 
The failure of the U.S. Supreme Court to provide a usable test of what a natural 
product may be is abundantly clear when we try to apply the judgement to newer 
technologies. For example, what does the judgement tell us about the doctrine to 
help us assess DNA or DNA-like sequences made ab initio? Does it matter if the 
sequences are virtually the same as something known to exist in nature, made 
synthetically to make the same naturally existing proteins? Or if the sequences are 
completely different from those known to exist in nature, to make naturally existing 
proteins? Or if the sequences are completely different from those known to exist, 
to make non-naturally existing proteins? At what point do we have “human 
ingenuity”? 
What about genetic materials from prokaryotes, which have no introns and 
thus no “cDNA”? Or genomic biomarkers, which are genetic sequences that are 
used to identify species or diseases? The decision also did not deal with RNA 
molecules. Not only did the U.S. Supreme Court fail to address the RNA analogues 
of DNA for polypeptide production, but it also failed to address noncoding RNA 
(ncRNA), transfer RNA (tRNA), ribosomal RNA (rRNA), micro RNA (miRNA), 
and small interfering RNAs (siRNA). It also did not refer to polypeptide sequences. 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision gives us no guidance as to how these 
questions should be answered and whether we should take an informational or 
structural rationale, or both.165 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has 
added some clarification in its 2014 Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility of 
Claims Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural Products 
(Guidance).166 Though the PTO noted that the Myriad decision was limited to nucleic 
acids (not differentiating between types of nucleic acids), it stated that the decision 
reminds us that “claims reciting or involving natural products should be examined 
for a marked difference.”167 For product claims, the claim has to be “markedly 
different in structure from naturally occurring products.”168 The PTO stated that 
“[n]ot all differences rise to the level of marked differences, for example, merely 
 
163. Samantak Ghosh, Gene Patents: Balancing the Myriad Issues Concerning the Patenting of Natural 
Products, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 241, 262–66 (2012). 
164. Burk, supra note 4, at 98–101. 
165. A more recent preliminary injunction decision from the U.S. District Court has not helped 
the matter. See In re BRCA1- & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1213 
(D. Utah 2014). 
166. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING SUBJECT 
MATTER ELIGIBILITY OF CLAIMS RECITING OR INVOLVING LAWS OF NATURE, NATURAL 
PHENOMENA & NATURAL PRODUCTS (2014). 
167. Id. at 1. 
168. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
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isolating a nucleic acid changes its structure (by breaking bonds) but that change 
does not create a marked difference in structure between the isolated nucleic acid 
and its naturally occurring counterpart.”169 The PTO focus on structural “marked 
differences” stems from the Diamond v. Chakrabarty U.S. Supreme Court decision,170 
which was not a major focal point in Myriad and instead centred on the fact that 
Myriad Genetics “did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”171 
Despite the very structural focus that the PTO took when setting out the test 
to be used, they then introduced the role of function in one of the outlined examples 
pertaining to a pair of primers. The PTO stated that the primers were not 
structurally markedly different and: 
Further, the first and second primers have the same function as their natural 
counterpart DNA, i.e., to hybridize to their complementary nucleotide 
sequences. The minor structural differences taken together with the lack of any 
functional difference between the primers and the natural DNA fail to 
demonstrate that the recited products are markedly different from what 
exists in nature.172 
The PTO thus seems to take a mixed structural-functional approach. At the end of 
the day, even if the U.S. approach is to be purely structural, the subjective term 
“marked” is by no means clear cut. The PTO stated that not all differences are 
“marked” differences, using the example of simply isolating nucleic acid as not 
“marked.”173 But this tells us nothing more than what Myriad does. If an isolated 
nucleic acid is modified by a researcher, is this then “markedly different”? Does this 
depend on the modification? Does this depend on the function of the modification 
or if a new property is introduced? 
What the PTO does make clear is that the ease with which the subject matter 
is obtained is irrelevant. It stated that “[t]he fact that a marked difference came 
about as a result of routine activity or via human manipulation of natural processes 
does not prevent the marked difference from weighing in favor of patent 
eligibility.”174 The PTO used cDNA as an example of something that is markedly 
different from natural occurring DNA and eligible subject matter, even though 
making cDNA is routine in the biotechnology field.175 Analogously, this should 
mean that the difficulty with which one has to obtain the claimed subject matter is 
equally as irrelevant for the determination of whether there is an “invention.” 
 
169. Id. at 5. 
170. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
171. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013). 
172. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 166, at 12 (emphasis added). 
173. Id. at 5. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
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B. The Biotech Industry 
Given the uncertainty surrounding what exactly the Myriad decision denotes 
in the United States, it is difficult to gauge what it means in the European context. 
It is possible that the biotech industry will see Europe as a friendlier environment 
within which to undertake biotech research and—more to the point—to 
commercialise biotech inventions. Evidently, there are less granted gene-related 
patents in Europe than the United States, partly because many applications are not 
followed through.176 If the European market looks more fertile for 
commercialisation, this may change. At the same time, European-based biotech 
companies may find it harder to commercialise their inventions in the United States. 
This largely depends on what is deemed to be “markedly different,” or, in other 
words, how much one has to change in order for the subject matter to no longer be 
a “natural product.” The easier the standard is to overcome, the smaller the trickle-
down effect that will be felt in Europe as a consequence of the Myriad decision. 
However, the analysis of the impact on the biotech industry would not be 
complete if we did not also consider the Myriad decision together with Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.177 In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that a diagnostic method using metabolite thresholds to determine correct dosage 
of a medicament was a mere recitation of a natural law.178 At the Federal Circuit 
level of the Myriad case (in a part of the decision that was not reconsidered by the 
Supreme Court), the Mayo decision was used to rule that a method of analysing a 
patient’s BRCA sequence and comparing it to a normal (wild-type) sequence to 
identify cancer-disposing mutations was not an invention but the recitation of an 
abstract idea.179 The claims did not apply the step of comparing two sequences in a 
process but rather only recited the abstract mental steps necessary to compare two 
different sequences.180 The Federal Circuit, however, held to be valid a method for 
screening potential cancer therapeutics, via growing a transformed eukaryotic host 
cell containing an altered BRCA1 gene (which causes cancer) in the presence of a 
suspected cancer therapeutic, and measuring the rate of growth and comparing it to 
the growth when not in the presence of the therapeutic.181 This is because the steps 
of comparing cell growth rates and growing the transformed cells were 
“transformative.”182 
 
176. Huys et al., supra note 149, at 908. 
177. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
178. Id. at 1297. 
179. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–35 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 1335–37. 
182. Id. The transformed eukaryotic host cell containing an altered BRCA genes would 
potentially be patentable subject matter due to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980), 
which held that bacteria with extra genetic material was a “nonnaturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity . . . .” The intervention of man resulted in 
bacteria with “markedly different characteristics” from nature and “the potential for significant utility,” 
resulting in patentable subject matter. Id. at 310. 
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Taken together, Myriad and Mayo severely narrowed the scope of biotech 
patents. This is supported by the PTO’s statement in its 2014 Guidance that “the 
correlation between the presence of misfolded protein ABC in blood and 
degenerative disease X is a natural principle.”183 As a consequence, mutations such 
as the “185delAG → ter39” mutation would be difficult to patent, as the mutations 
themselves would be mere natural products as per Myriad, and the fact that the 
mutations are cancer causing would be considered to be natural laws as per Mayo.184 
Similarly, single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or genomic biomarkers and 
methods for their use to determine the presence, susceptibility and prognosis of a 
disease would likely fall under Myriad and Mayo. One would have to claim such 
mutations, SNPs, and genomic biomarkers in very specific method claims that do 
not foreclose other methods and that are not purely conventional or routine in the 
art, possibly in conjunction with something that does not exist in nature.185 In 
contrast, the patentability of method claims in Europe is far broader, allowing claims 
for detecting a disease or mutation or comparing genetic sequences.186 The 
combined effect of the two cases may, therefore, make Europe seem a far friendlier 
place for the biotech industry, and investment in infrastructure, research, and 
commercialisation may increase in biotech strongholds, such as Germany and 
Switzerland. 
Nevertheless, where a biotech company is based and commercialises its 
products is determined by many factors, of which patent law is only one. The United 
States has many other factors that make it a good home for industry and for 
commercialisation. For example, the country is stable and secure and has both good 
infrastructure and a relatively well-educated populace. It also has a relatively large 
population representing a wealthy consumer base. As a consequence, it seems 
unlikely that the biotech companies would simply choose to move to Europe or to 
focus on other patent-friendlier markets for commercialisation. It is far more 
probable that they will seek other means to retain a competitive advantage. For 
example, companies may choose to keep more as trade secrets, both in the United 
States and in Europe. A large part of why Myriad Genetics had a competitive 
advantage did not even have to do with their BRCA patents, but rather with their 
immense and secret database of mutations, related clinical outcomes, and patient 
data relating to breast cancer.187 The impact of Myriad could be to encourage biotech 
 
183. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 166, at 13. 
184. There are those that argue that it is correct that a link between a mutation and a disease be 
considered “a fact derived from nature, and the activity of identifying and making this link constitutes 
a mental act (or even a discovery) rather than an invention.” Isabelle Huys et al., The Fate and Future of 
Patents on Human Genes and Genetic Diagnostic Methods, 13 NAT. REV. GENETICS 441, 445 (2012). 
185. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 166, at 14. 
186. See, e.g., Huys et al., supra note 184, at 444; Isabelle Huys et al., Gene and Genetic Diagnostic 
Method Patent Claims: A Comparison Under Current European and US Patent Law, 19 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 
1104, 1106–07 (2011). One way in which method-claim patentability is still wider in the United States 
is through claims for methods of medical treatment, which are not patentable in Europe. European 
Patent Convention, art. 53(c), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as amended Nov. 29, 2000). 
187. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing 
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companies to emulate such behaviour, which could prove to be negative for both 
research and the healthcare systems of the United States and Europe. 
One could argue that a negative aspect of the Myriad decision is that Europe-
based companies may find it harder to recoup their costs in the United States. 
However, the impact of Myriad may be significantly cushioned by the fact that the 
trend in Europe and the United States had, in any case, been to move away from 
broad nucleic acid claims or at least to diversify the invention across many types of 
claims. This is in part because many genetic sequences have been published and are 
part of the public domain.188 In Europe, claims have become narrower because of 
the strict way in which the inventive step standard has been policed, meaning that 
simply isolated genetic materials are often claimed as part of method claims rather 
than product claims.189 The obviousness standard in the United States has similarly 
been construed more strictly with respect to whole-gene patents.190 A potential 
difficulty may arise from the fact that biomarkers, including genomic biomarkers, 
are becoming more important and product claims over them are still sought.191 The 
difficulty is lesser in Europe, where they can be claimed within method or use 
claims. It is more problematic in the United States, where their method or use claims 
may be nonpatentable due to Mayo. Indeed, it seems that the largest difference 
between the United States and Europe may play out with method claims, not 
product claims. 
A potential implication of the Myriad ruling, and the fact that the law in Europe 
and the United States is now different, is that patent drafters will have to take more 
care in their priority filings. If first filed in the United States, a patent has to be 
broad enough to set priority for an EPO filing that allows for wider subject matter. 
This means that one may have to include claims that one knows will be rejected. If 
first filed in through the EPO, it must be done so in a way that valuable claims can 
still be made in the U.S. filing. It may be that applications will simply have to have 
more and diverse claims. However, as noted above, the strict means by which the 
EPO assesses the inventive step standard may mean that the difference between 
what can be patented as a product through the EPO compared to in the United 
States is not so great. In other words, one could say that the United States narrows 
claims earlier through the eligible subject matter inquiry, whereas the EPO narrows 
later with the inventive step standard. In any case, because of the unclear interpretation 
 
Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1369 (2011); E. Richard Gold & Julia 
Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, GENETICS MED. April 2010, at S39, S61. Of course, 
they were partly able to build such a large database because of the patents they held. 
188. Huys et al., supra note 184, at 446. 
189. The European inventive step standard is generally considered to be stricter than the U.S. 
nonobviousness standard. This is because it uses a problem-and-solution approach, whereby an 
examiner or court has to ask whether the invention would have been an obvious solution to an 
“objective technical problem” to a person skilled in the art, in light of the “closest prior art”; see EPO 
Guidelines, supra note 14, pt. G, ch. VII-3; cf. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) 
(reaffirming Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)). 
190. See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
191. Matthijs et al., supra note 142, at 709. 
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of “markedly different,” patent drafters may deem it prudent to include multiple 
product claims with a range of alterations in order to ensure that some claims are 
held valid. 
Overall, taken together, Myriad and Mayo have potentially broad implications 
for the biotech industry in Europe. However, these implications are significantly 
dampened by: (1) other factors that make the United States an attractive place to 
operate and commercialise biotech inventions; (2) the trend away from patenting 
simply isolated biological materials; and (3) the strict way that the EPO assesses 
whether there is an inventive step. 
C. Research in Europe 
The impact of the narrowing scope of patentable subject matter in the United 
States on research in Europe will depend on the exact facts at hand. If invented in 
the United States and no patent is sought anywhere because of nonpatentability in 
the United States, researchers from everywhere gain. If something is patented in 
Europe but not in the United States, researchers from the latter could have an 
advantage over those in the former. It is important to remember, however, that 
unlike the United States, which has virtually no experimental use exception,192 most 
European countries have an exception for research. Under the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Community Patent Agreement from 1989, the exception allows 
“acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes” and “for experimental 
purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention,”193 where the 
latter relates to determining the scope of the patent, whether the patent disclosure 
is adequate and to seek further knowledge about the patented invention.194 It can 
include research to seek more scientific knowledge and technical improvement. 
Most EU Member States do not confine the experimental use exception to purely 
noncommercial use, so long as the research is really related to the subject matter of 
 
192. Currently, there is no legislated exception in the United States; the common law (court-
recognised) exception is extremely narrow in the United States and the research cannot have the 
slightest tinge of commercial interest. Even if there is no immediate commercial interest, it must be 
confined to private study “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.” 
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Specifically, it does not apply to actions 
that are “in keeping with the alleged infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of commercial 
implications.” Id. at 1362. “Legitimate business” has been defined broadly, such as to include research 
by nonprofit or government-funded research institutions and universities because their legitimate 
business is research. Id. at 1362–63; see also Roche Prods. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of Structural 
Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 877–88 (2006). 
193. European Economic Community (EEC), Convention for the European Patent for the 
Common Market, Agreement Relating to Community Patents, art. 27(a)–(b), 89/695/EEC, 1989 O.J. 
(L 401) 1, 15. Note, however, that this agreement is not in force, as only Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom ratified it. Switzerland has implemented 
similar exceptions to infringement in Art. 9.1 of the Patents Act 1954 (CH) (amended by No. I of the 
Federal Act of June 22, 2007, in force since July 1, 2008), despite that it is not a member of the EEC. 
194. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 60(5) (U.K.); Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 
R.P.C. 515 (1985). 
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the patented invention.195 The existence of the private use exception has been 
interpreted to mean that the experimental use exception must include commercial 
use.196 Thus, even if something is patented in Europe but not the United States, it 
may not always be the case that U.S. researchers have an advantage over European 
researchers. 
As discussed above, a likely situation is that companies will simply keep more 
information and knowledge in nonpublicly disclosed forms, such as trade secrets 
and nonpublicly disclosed databases. If they do so, they will obviously do so 
internationally. At the same time, we cannot presume that researchers from 
universities and publicly funded institutes will not also keep their information and 
knowledge this way, with patent trends showing that such institutes are propertising 
their research results more and more.197 Because of the cumulative nature of 
biotechnology,198 the locking up of information and knowledge in such regimes 
could prove to be a detriment to research in the field, whether in the United States 
or Europe. 
On the other hand, this very much depends on the strategy chosen by the 
keepers of the information/knowledge. It may well be that patents, even in 
restricted form, are a necessary component of a business model, perhaps together 
with trade secrecy and nonpublicly disclosed databases. This is not new, as 
illustrated by Myriad Genetics’ approach to their BRCA research. This is 
strengthened by the fact that not all types of information or knowledge can be kept 
secret or in databases, such that patents have an integral role in incentivising 
invention and innovation. In such situations, the Myriad decision has the effect of 
encouraging better invention, or perhaps less fundamental research, in the United 
States (as simply isolating biological materials is becoming more and more standard) 
and restricting patentability to what inventors actually contribute, leaving the rest 
open for future research. 
What may prove to benefit Europe is the perception of investors that Europe 
is more biotech friendly, as noted above. It may be that U.S. researchers have more 
freedom to research with less proprietary red tape (though arguably they will just 
encounter different red tape related to trade secrets); however, it is a separate 
question whether anyone would be willing to bring a product to market in the 
absence of patent protection. Within modern patent systems, patents are not only 
necessary to incentivise invention, but also innovation. The incentive is not only for 
the patentees themselves, but also for potential investors or venture capitalists, who 
require property as collateral and something well-defined to contract around, and 
 
195. Monsanto, R.P.C. 515, at 538; see also AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION (ALRC), 
GENES AND INGENUITY REPORT: GENE PATENTING AND HUMAN HEALTH, 339–41 (2004). 
196. CORNISH ET AL., supra note 10, at ¶ 21–21. 
197. See, e.g., Nicolas van Zeebroeck et al., Patents and Academic Research: A State of the Art, 9 J. 
INTELL. CAPITAL 246, 249–51 (2008). 
198. James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest, 11 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 30, 55–56 (2012); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of 
Patents, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 541, 542 (2012). 
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also a “signal” or evidence as to the potential of the invention and the competence 
of the patentees.199 Of course, whether Europe is seen to be better for 
commercialisation depends on the invention and if it could be claimed in a way such 
that a strong proprietary right is obtained covering the commercially valuable use in 
the United States or if a commercial advantage could be maintained through secrecy. 
However, it could be that the United States becomes a fertile ground for invention 
(i.e., research) but that Europe seen as more fruitful place for innovation (i.e., 
commercialisation). 
D. The Policy Discussion in Europe 
Perhaps even more interesting is the effect that the Myriad decision will have 
on the policy discussion in Europe. Of course, the EU and the U.S. legal systems 
are separate and do not set precedents for one another. However, it is not unheard 
of that important or revolutionary U.S. Supreme Court decisions influence patent 
law and practice around the world.200 Harmonisation between different nations is 
also desirable, as it smoothens the international application process. Moreover, if 
the Biotech Directive was largely adopted in order to ensure that the EU could 
compete with the United States and Japan, the decision has arguably given Directive 
naysayers some arsenal. From a logical perspective, the scope and effect of the 
Myriad decision on the Biotech Directive can only be narrow because the Directive 
is far broader in scope than just nucleic acids and materials isolated from biological 
specimens. However, the subject matter of the decision, gDNA, is so controversial 
for the average person, or even the average politician, who may not understand 
other biotech inventions, that the decision could have strong political force. 
Countries such as the Netherlands, France, and Germany were already 
strongly opposed to the Biotech Directive, particularly with respect to human 
genes.201 As a Member State of the EU, Germany was obliged to implement the 
Biotech Directive by July 30, 2000.202 However, as a consequence of heated debate 
within the Federal Parliament regarding the patentability of biotechnology and 
particularly absolute gene-related claims, Germany missed this deadline.203 It was 
not until after a ruling by the Court of Justice of the EU that Germany was in 
violation of its EU obligations that Germany implemented the Biotech Directive,204 
 
199. Hall & Harhoff, supra note 198, at 542; Dietmar Harhoff, The Role of Patents and Licenses in 
Securing External Finance for Innovation, 14 EIB PAPERS 74, 80–82 (2009). 
200. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (holding that genetically 
modified organisms are capable of being a “manufacture” or “composition of matter,” and opening 
the door for biotech patents, is such a decision); Huys et al., supra note 184, at 1106. 
201. See, e.g., Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-07079; Case C-126/03, Comm’n of the European Cmtys. v. 
Fed. Republic of Germany, 2004 E.C.R. I-11197. 
202. Biotech Directive, supra note 7, art. 15. 
203. JOSEPH STRAUS, Product Patents on Human DNA Sequences: An Obstacle for Implementing the 
EU Biotech Directive?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 65, 69 
(F.Scott Kieff ed., 2003). 
204. Case C-126/03, Comm’n of the European Cmties., 2004 E.C.R. I-11197. 
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which came into force on March 1, 2005.205 However, the German legislature chose 
to specifically delineate that claims for human genetic sequences can only be 
purpose bound, stipulating that: 
Where the subject matter of an invention is a sequence or a partial sequence 
of a gene, the structure of which is identical to the structure of a natural 
sequence or partial sequence of a human gene, the use thereof, for which 
industrial application is specifically described in subsection (3), shall have to be included 
in the patent claim.206 
Similarly, the law in France states that the discovery of a sequence or partial 
sequence of a gene cannot constitute patentable inventions nor can the total or 
partial sequences of a gene as such.207 However, technical applications of a function 
of isolated human genetic sequences are patentable subject matter, but the 
protection only extends to the implementation and operation of the particular 
application.208 Article L611.18 of the Intellectually Property Code states: 
Only an invention constituting a technical application of a function of an 
element of the human body may be protected by a patent. This protection 
shall cover the element of the human body only to the extent necessary to 
the realization and the exploitation of this particular use. Such use must be 
disclosed in the patent application in a concrete and precise manner. The 
following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: 
. . . . 
d) total or partial sequences of a gene as such.209 
 The Myriad decision may highlight and pronounce the reservations already 
existent in Europe. Whether this will lead to any legislative change in EU law is 
difficult to say. This is for several reasons. Firstly, the Directive was not only 
implemented in reaction to broad patentability in the United States but also in the 
tech giant Japan, which still allows for patentability of isolated biological 
materials.210 Secondly, as noted above, exactly what the Myriad decision entails is far 
from clear, and until it has been settled by the PTO and the U.S. courts (especially 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), it would seem rash for the EU to 
react. It may be that Myriad is read very narrowly, for example, only to exclude 
simply isolated human genetic sequences from patentability—“human” because in 
the writ of certiorari that the U.S. Supreme Court granted to hear the appeal, the 
 
205. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über den rechtlichen Schutz biotechnologischer 
Erfdungen [Act Implementing the Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions], 
Jan. 21, 2005, BGB-I 6, 146. 
206. Patent Act 1980 (DE), sec. 1a(4) (as amended July 31, 2009) (emphasis added). 
207. Code de la propriété intellectuelle [Intellectual Property Code] (FR), art. L611-18 (inserted 
by Act No. 2004-800 of August 6, 2004, art. 17a II, Official Journal of Aug. 7, 2004). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. That the United States has stepped away from the law in Europe and Japan may prove 
challenging for the trilateral cooperation set up in 1983 among the USPTO, EPO and Japan Patent 
Office ( JPO). 
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Court limited the inquiry to the question of whether human genes are patentable.211 
Furthermore, the standard of “marked difference” may prove to be a very easy one 
to surpass. Thirdly, as a consequence of a challenge against the Directive from the 
Netherlands, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled in 2001 that the patenting of 
genetic and other materials isolated from the human body as per the Biotech 
Directive does not contravene human dignity.212 Taken together with the fact that 
the Biotech Directive took an opposition-filled fifteen years to pass, it may very 
well be that the EU legislature has no wish to revisit the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
What may or may not constitute an “invention” in the United States is by no 
means clear. This is in large part because of the sparseness of legislative guidance 
on the matter, forcing courts to interpret the court-made exception for “natural 
products,” which has proven to be challenging with the advent of the life sciences. 
Despite the wait and the hype, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Myriad decision was 
disappointing. In contrast, the EU passed the Biotech Directive in 1998, which was 
quickly adopted by the EPO. As a consequence, the patentability of certain types of 
biotechnologies is far clearer in Europe. Perhaps more importantly, the policy 
discussion attached to the Directive is indicative of the legislative intent, which is 
useful for analysing the patentability of new technologies. 
Though Myriad did not set out a robust test for determining what is an 
“invention” as opposed to a “natural product,” it did make it clear that simply 
isolated genetic sequences do not constitute inventions. It remains to be seen 
whether this decision will be read narrowly or broadly by other courts, particularly 
the Federal Circuit, making it difficult to say what the consequences of the decision 
may be in the European context. Generally, the potential narrowness of the 
decision, along with the strength of the biotech industry in the United States and 
the fact that fewer patents were being granted for simply isolated sequences, suggest 
that the impact of the decision on the biotech industry will not be colossal. 
However, taken together with Mayo, it is possible that Europe will be viewed as 
more biotech-patent friendly. With respect to research, it is possible that U.S. 
researchers will have more freedom to operate; however, Europe will be seen by 
potential investors as a more favourable place to commercialise inventions than the 
United States. This is very much dependent on the particular facts at hand, as many 
information or knowledge holders may decide to lock this up as trade secrets or in 
nonpublicly disclosed databases, which would impact negatively on research in 
Europe and the United States. 
It remains to be seen whether the Myriad decision will enter into the European 
policy discussion on patent law. Notwithstanding the Biotech Directive and EPO 
 
211. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
212. Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union, 2001 E.C.R. I-07079. 
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law, biotech patents are still considered to be controversial, particularly those 
pertaining to genes. When we consider that the Directive was largely adopted in 
order to ensure that the EU could compete with the United States, the Myriad 
decision seems to be a ready weapon for opponents of the Biotech Directive. 
However, until the exact implications of Myriad are clarified in the United States, 
any move for change would be imprudent. 
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